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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Beer Game was developed in the 1960s by the MIT 
Sloan System Dynamics Group (Sterman, 1984) as a didactic 
tool to simulate information and material flows along the 
supply chain from the factory to the retailer. The main goal of 
this business game is to show the existence and the 
characteristics of the “Bullwhip effect” (Lee et al. 1997). The 
Beer Game has four players: retailer, wholesaler, distributor 
and factory. These players are distributed along a single 
supply chain, communicating with each other only about the 
beer orders that each player sends to the nearest one. The 
only exception refers to the retailer’s order, represented by 
the requests of the final customer, which are established in 
advance and are not known by other participants. 
Many critics raise questions about the limitations in the 
original Beer Game (for convenience, we will refer to as MIT 
Beer Game) and suggest some alternatives. Kaminsky and 
Simchi-Levi (1998) highlight the limits of the Beer Game in 
providing a better way to manage the supply chain. These 
critics also highlight that the game structure does not provide 
a realistic view of the behaviors involved in the supply chain. 
Indeed a linear chain does not allow any choice about the 
suppliers. Kimbrough et al. (2002) describe the players 
behavior when they join the supply chain. In their view, 
players are not motivated to share information; their choices 
are taken in situations of bounded rationality and their 
individual rational behavior sometimes goes against the 
group’s interests. These and other critics (Chen and 
Samroengraja 2000) suggest a number of digital versions of 
the MIT Beer Game in order to take into account the 
variables involved. 
Other studies (Ming 2001, Anderson 1994, Beamon 1998) 
show how the supply chain evolves into network solutions 
based on collaborative and communicative interactions 
between two or more enterprises and oriented towards the 
coordination of different activities. In such contexts, 
transaction costs are a key issue to be taken into account 
(Williamson 1981, Lajili and Mahoney 2006). Within this 
framework, other critics propose formal representations of 
issues such as transaction costs and risks in virtual enterprises 
(D'Atri and Motro, 2007). Consequently, studying players’ 
policies and behaviors involved in the supply chain is 
extremely interesting when either the choice of the suppliers 
or transaction risk management issues are introduced.  
This study has been carried out in the context of the MA in 
"collaborative management of the supply chain" held at the 
Luiss University in Rome. The MA has a special focus on 
interoperability issues and critical relationships among 
companies in many productive sectors. We tested the 
standard version of the MIT Beer Game and our results were 
in line with previous findings. We also designed three 
alternative versions of this simulation game in order to 
highlight the specific features of modern supply chains such 
as the network enterprise structure and the possibility of 
transaction failures. We tried to understand the policies 
underlying the behavior of players involved in a supply chain 
through simulations. These simulations also led us to obtain a 
proof of concept of the new versions of the Beer Game that 
are now available for further investigations about the 
dynamics of cooperation among the supply chain 
participants. 
In the next sections we first describe the main characteristics 
of each version of the Beer Game in terms of rules, objectives 
and simulation results. Then we perform a comparative 
analysis of the findings through a discussion focused on costs 
and policies. Finally, we summarise the results by providing 
some observations about the limitation of this approach and 
possible further developments.  
 
2. BEER GAME 1.0 
2.1  Description 
On the basis of the studies on virtual enterprises, transaction 
costs and risk management, we defined three versions of the 
MIT Beer Game in order to analyze the policies which affect 
the supply chain actors behavior. The first version (also 
referred to as Beer Game 1.0) is very similar to the original 
version in terms of chain structure. It differs only in the shape 
of the market requests since we applied random orders 
ranging in a 0-10 set of values corresponding to 44 cards 
taken from a deck. 
The game has four players with the following roles: retailer, 
wholesaler, distributor, and factory. All of them are on the 
same linear chain. 
The retailer receives a beer order from the final consumer 
(card deck) hiding it from the other players; then, according 
to his/her policy, the retailer forwards an order to the 
wholesaler. The wholesaler sends the order to the distributor 
and when the order reaches the factory, the last player 
decides how many beers to produce. Each step has a 2 week 
lead time for both goods and information. The quality of each 
single policy undertaken by the players is assessed on the 
basis of stock cost values. 
In order to support data collection and analysis, each player 
uses an electronic spreadsheet, which includes data related to 
sent and received orders, and goods. 
2.2  Simulation 
In this simulation the Bullwhip effect is not as clear as in the 
original simulation because, at the beginning of the game, 
players try to increase their inventories and thus the related 
costs. In this case, backlog events are briefer than the original 
simulation, which is the most important element of the 
Bullwhip effect. This is mainly due to the demand faced by 
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the players, which is different from the one of the MIT beer  
game; this has a stable value at the beginning of the game, 
then it has an instant positive change that leads to a new 
constant higher value for the rest of the game. This step 
increase inevitably leads players to backlogs. 
In Beer Game 1.0 we explored the case of the stochastic 
demand where demand was randomly generated from a 
known distribution, e.g., uniformly distributed between a set 
of values ranging from 0 to 10.  At first, players increased 
stock levels to avoid backlog events. Then, they tried to 
estimate the variation range production chain. The cost 
analysis of the first simulation shows very similar levels to 
the MIT Beer Game costs (higher in players farthest from the 
final market).  
The only significant differences noted were in the costs of the 
final retailer (higher in comparison to the two middlemen, i.e. 
equal to 5.508). This can be explained as follows: using a 
Never Backlog strategy and knowing the variation of the 
final demand and the decrease of the goods required by the 
market, the distributor’s initial strategy aims at increasing the 
warehouse levels during the first weeks and then have a 
constant request equal to the average expected level (equal to 
5); in the original game, goods required by the market had a 
constant value equal to 8, while, in the simulation, the 
average value was approximately 4,75. Despite taking into 
account the producer’s total costs (reaching the value of 
11.952), the lack of the Bullwhip Effect caused many 
difficulties to sell off warehouse stock. As to the middlemen, 
the wholesaler provides interesting insights: he adopted the 
Just in Time model but, due to the delay of orders and 
delivery of goods (leading to a 4-week postponement), he 
was not able to avoid an oversized warehouse or backlog 
events. However, he managed to have the lowest cost (equal 
to 2.376). 
3. BEER GAME 2.0 
3.1  Description 
In this version of the game, Beer Game 2.0, we introduced 
some differences in comparison to the previous version. 
Firstly, players are not in the same linear chain. Starting from 
the retailer, a new diagram is created and the two middlemen 
are placed on parallel lines. Secondly, the retailer can chose 
to send the order to both the wholesalers or only to one of 
them. Finally, the factory manager, on the basis of his own 




Beer Game 2.0 Supply Chain 
 
In this simulation we used another spreadsheet and, unlike 
the previous version (1.0), it is customized to each player. 
Firstly, the orders placed by the two wholesalers are 
separated and distinguished. Secondly, the factory manager 
can choose which order to deal with on the basis of his/her 
policy. Thirdly, the retailer dashboard is used to register the 
beers received by the two different wholesalers, their 
incoming orders, and orders placed.  
3.2 Simulation 
 
The second simulation provided interesting results. The 
players’ total costs are similar to the levels achieved in 
simulation Beer Game 1.0 (the factory is the player with the 
highest cost, followed by the retailer that adopted the same 
strategy, and finally the two wholesalers). Both the 


























Beer Game 2.0: Player's Cost
Total Cost Ws1 + 
Ws2
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wholesalers’ total costs are equal to the retailer’s cost during 
this simulation (after 44 weeks, the retailer scored 14.712 and 
both wholesalers scored 14.574).  
The Factory generally has the highest costs (17.490) because 
it is the player farthest from the market and from the 
information relating to the demand. The sum of the two 
wholesalers’ costs are very similar to the retailer’s cost. From 
this perspective, the retailer has high costs due to the 
implementation of a Full Warehouse strategy, which is not 
the most suitable strategy in a market with such a low 
variability.  
  
4. BEER GAME 2.1 
4.1  Description 
In comparison to the previous version, Beer Game 2.1 takes 
risk management into account. The two wholesalers might 
not be able to receive the goods sent by the factory. In that 
case, they can transfer the beers available in stock and try to 
fulfil the new orders. The other players do not know how 
many times this could happen. This variable is 
predetermined: the high risk wholesaler has high block 
probability (P=0.5) and low backlog costs (Cr= C·(1-P)); the 
low risk wholesaler has a lower risk (P=0.16) and higher 
backlog costs. In particular: 
- The high risk wholesaler pays 3 euros for each beer crate in 
the warehouse and 6 euros for each backlog order. 
- The low risk wholesaler pays 5 euros for each beer crate in 
the warehouse and 10 euros for each backlog order. 
The retailer does not know which of the wholesalers poses 
the greatest risk, but they can try to implement policies to 
find this out (for example, by estimating failed orders). 
4.2 Simulation 
Analysing the total costs of simulation Beer Game 2.1, we 
observed that the Factory has the highest costs (28,752), as 
well as in other simulations. The two wholesalers adopted 
different strategies; the low-risk wholesaler adopted the low-
cost strategy, allowing him to successfully meet the changes 
in demand, while the high-risk player, much inclined to take 
risks, adopted the Pass Order strategy to reduce the 
inventory's cost. Nevertheless, the wholesalers’ costs were 
lower in comparison to the Retailer. The total of their cost 
(i.e. 10.348) is less than the cost of the Retailer (i.e. 11.430) 
because the wholesaler maintained a Low Cost policy.  
5. DISCUSSION 
The results of the three simulations can be analysed from two 
different perspectives: (i) the policies implemented by each 
player and (ii) warehouse and backlog costs. From a 
methodological point of view, each player is asked to review 
data collected on their behavior and to describe the strategy 
adopted. As to the cost analysis, data collected on each 
dashboard were compared. 
5.1 Policies  
The policies implemented by the players can be summed up 
as follows: 
BEER GAME 1.0 
Factory: On the basis of the first orders, the factory tries to 
create a warehouse able to meet the market demand, avoid 
backlogs and, afterwards, to set up a strategy aimed at 
reducing stock levels. 
Wholesaler no. 1: Wholesaler no. 1 firstly implements the 
“never backlog” strategy aiming at having stock levels able 
to successfully meet the estimated maximum market demand 
(10); then, once the wholesaler has reached stock levels equal 
to 10, they send orders to wholesaler no. 2 which are equal to 
the orders received by the distributor (pass over strategy). 
Wholesaler no. 2: Wholesaler no. 2 uses a balanced strategy 
in order to have a low-cost warehouse and, at the same time, 
to meet the market demand and avoid backlogs. 
Retailer: On the basis of the first orders, the retailer tries to 
create a warehouse able to meet the market demand and, 
afterwards, to set up a strategy aimed at reducing stock 
levels. 
BEER GAME 2.0 
Factory: by adopting a strategy with a cautious attitude to 
risk, the factory aims to have unsold stock levels capable of 
satisfying demand from the two middlemen, without running 
the risk of building up a backlog.  
Wholesaler no. 1: By adopting a balanced strategy, 
wholesaler no. 1 aims to keep stocks not particularly high but 
always capable of serving orders, minimize costs and avoid 
backlogs. 
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Wholesaler no. 2: By adopting a strategy with a cautious 
attitude to risk, wholesaler no. 2 aims to have enough stock 
levels to avoid building up a backlog and deal with new 
orders.  
Retailer: By adopting a strategy with a cautious attitude to 
risk, the retailer firstly aims to have a warehouse able to meet 
the market demand without running the risk of building up a 
backlog; then, he tries to slowly reduce unsold stock. 
BEER GAME 2.1 
Factory: At first, the factory aims at creating a warehouse 
able to meet the demand of the two middlemen, both of 
whom are risk subjects. Then, the factory assesses the most 
suitable strategies to reduce unsold stock. 
High risk wholesaler: At first, the  high risk wholesaler aims 
at keeping the warehouse at initial levels and then, on the 
basis of orders received, aims at reducing stock levels and 
meeting orders received. 
Low risk wholesaler: Aware of playing the role of the “low 
risk” middlemen, their main aim is keeping the lowest unsold 
stock levels. 
Retailer: The retailer places substantial orders to both 
wholesalers aiming at creating a warehouse able to face 
demand variations and, later on during the game, at 
identifying the riskiest wholesaler in order to reduce stock 
levels and costs. 
 
We used this policy matrix to compare the policies 
(Davenport and Harris, 2005) adopted by players and their 
willingness to take risks related to two variables: unsold 
stock and placed orders. The three simulations that we carried 
out highlight two main policies in the warehouse 
management: “Never Backlog” and “Pass Order”. In the first 
policy, players try to foresee the customer demand and to be 
always able to satisfy that request. A negative demand 
variation (near to zero) leads to high stock levels and higher 
costs that they are not able to reduce.  
In the Pass Order policy, the player shows a greater 
willingness to take risks, as demonstrated by the intention of 
keeping low stock levels to reduce costs. Delays in goods 
delivery are common to all players; they have a negative 
impact on their choice and often lead players to backlog 
events. Simulations highlight how players were led to make 
choices on the basis of these two main policies, trying to fill 
their warehouse or reduce costs and showing higher or lower 
willingness to take risks.  
 
 Beer Game 1.0 Beer Game 2.0 Beer Game 2.1 
Factory Never backlog Never backlog Full warehouse 
Wholesaler no. 1 Pass order Low Cost Low cost 
Wholesaler no. 2 Full warehouse Never backlog Pass order 
Retailer Full warehouse Full warehouse Never backlog 
5.2 Costs 
During the three Beer Game simulations, we observed that 
the costs of each player reflected the results of the MIT Beer 
Game simulation; the player farthest from the market always 
has higher costs. With the exception of the Retailer costs 
(which are always higher in comparison to the Wholesalers in 
the three simulations), the Factory has higher costs due to the 
total absorption of market demand by the players. This 
resulted in no supply demand by the wholesalers and the 
factory being unable to clear unsold stock. 
 
A comparison between the cost trend in the three simulations 
is extremely interesting. A significant cost increase can be 
observed between Beer Game 1.0 and Beer Game 2.0, due to 
an insufficient market demand towards the supply chain (this 
also led to no players demand and stagnation of goods in 
most warehouses). During simulation Beer Game 2.1, the two 
wholesalers were given different costs on the basis of their 
attitude towards risk. For this reason they had lower costs in 
 UNSOLD STOCK 











Risk:  collapse or 
decrease in demand 




Condition:  Predicting an 
increase in demand 
Target:  increasing stock 
levels to avoid backlogs. 
















Condition:  the 
warehouse is able to 
respond to  positive 
changes in demand.  
Target:  Stable 
inventories with 
predictable costs. 





Target: low warehouse 
costs. 
Risk: risk of backlogs due 
to a variable demand 
increase and to delays in 
good delivery. 
 Beer Game 1.0 Beer Game 2.0 Beer Game 2.1 
Factory 11952 17490 28752 
Both 
wholesalers 
6384 14574 10348 
Retailer 5508 14712 11430 
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comparison to the Retailer cost and made their supply chain 
more cost-efficient. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
After defining the original supply chain of Sterman’s Beer 
Game, we created, tested and analyzed three variants. Then 
we collected data and interviewed the different players. At 
the end, we managed to analyze and outline the different 
strategies and costs involved. We obtained two main results: 
(i) we analyzed the relationship between strategies and 
structures of the supply chains and (ii) we endeavoured to 
provide a new didactic tool to show students the different 
implications of a supply chain which takes into account 
transaction costs and risks. 
With reference to the first aim, we noticed that players 
followed four strategies during the three simulations: never-
backlog, full warehouse, low cost and pass order. 
From a didactic point of view, these results are extremely 
interesting, highlighting the possibility of defining specific 
strategies within the distribution chain. 
The MIT Beer Game and our versions experienced similar 
limitations: firstly, the difficulty of providing a realistic 
vision of the supply chain management. Secondly: it is true 
that the game structure (where middlemen are placed on 
parallel lines) allows the retailer to choose suppliers but 
despite this, it cannot be compared to the actual complexities 
of a supply chain. Thirdly, we cannot forget that information 
exchange can be very slow and this represents a big 
limitation for players in the selection and implementation of 
strategies. Finally, simulations were carried out by the 
students of the MA course in “Collaborative management of 
the supply chain” held at the Luiss University and our data 
may have been influenced by the previous experience. On the 
basis of the latter limitation, we might develop new 
approaches to improve the game itself. It would be interesting 
(i) to involve students with no previous experience with the 
game; (ii) to simulate a supply chain where information is 
suddenly available for each player, and not have a slow 
information exchange as it happens with goods delays. In 
which case, the player would easily opt for a low cost policy, 
being able to rely on a strongly integrated supply chain. 
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